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ABSTRACT 
Despite high-profile divergences, competition officials in the European Union and 
United States frequently state a desire to reach convergent substantive decisions when 
regulating individual transatlantic merger cases. The extent of transatlantic 
convergence depends largely on the role of two domestic actors involved in the 
merger review process: regulators and firms. This article employs two competing 
approaches (principal-agent and regulatory capture) to assess the ways in which these 
actors and domestic institutions shape convergence in transatlantic merger review. 
Empirically, the article investigates the work of the EU-US Mergers Working Group 
and explores the extent to which it conforms more closely to the preferences of 
regulators or merging firms. By increasing procedural convergence over information 
exchanges, the competition regulators increase the likelihood of convergence in 
substantive decisions, which reduces the likelihood of intervention by political 
principals. The findings suggest that regulators have used their discretionary authority 
to overcome domestic political and legal institutions that obstruct information sharing 
and have reduced the information asymmetry traditionally enjoyed by merging firms. 
As a result, it is the regulatory agents who have shaped the convergent process via 
their discretionary authority and captured the merging firms to serve their regulatory 
interests. 
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I. Introduction 
Since the late 19
th
 century, the gradual proliferation of national competition 
policies reflects the emergence of free market economies throughout the world. These 
competition policies — broadly including merger review, cartel and monopoly 
policies and state aids — operate as regulatory tools to prevent anticompetitive 
business activity from undermining the benefits of competition in a domestic free 
market economy. As markets internationalize, however, the implementation of 
competition policy is no longer simply a behind-the-border matter of regulating 
domestic business activity. Rather, it becomes the subject of important bilateral and 
multilateral efforts to prevent political disputes and anticompetitive business activities 
from destabilizing the international political economy. 
Nowhere are the new pressures on domestic competition policies more evident 
than in the transatlantic marketplace, where officials in Brussels and Washington 
frequently regulate business activity that concurrently affects the domestic markets of 
the European Union (EU) and the United States of America (US). News media 
portrayals and academic work on transatlantic competition relations often focus on 
infrequent disagreements between EU and US regulatory authorities. For example, the 
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and GE/Honeywell mergers and Microsoft antitrust cases 
have received considerable attention and contributed to speculation that 
insurmountable divergences exist in the substance and procedures of EU and US 
competition policies.
1
 This article sets out to investigate in greater detail the accuracy 
of such common perceptions. 
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Transatlantic competition relations tend to follow largely from a bilateral 
framework designed to increase information exchanges. Within this bilateral 
framework, the EU and US have begun to pursue the convergence of regulatory 
procedures and substantive decisions in individual competition cases. A useful way to 
begin analyzing this transatlantic convergence is to explore the domestic politics that 
drive the process and determine outcomes in an important subsection of competition 
policy: merger review. Such an exploration intentionally moves beyond the current 
pre-occupation with single case studies of divergence to provide a more complete 
understanding of the state of EU-US competition relations. 
The central goal of the study is to evaluate the relative influence of domestic 
sources of convergence in EU and US merger review. Two sources, regulators and 
merging firms, are central to the analysis as the domestic actors most directly 
involved and responsible for the implementation of transatlantic merger review. From 
a theoretical perspective, the article concentrates on the explanatory power of two 
competing approaches, namely principal-agent and regulatory capture, that emphasize 
different actors as the potential drivers of convergence. In empirical terms, the article 
investigates the work of the EU-US Mergers Working Group (MWG), in particular its 
pursuit of convergence via the 2002 Best Practices Guidelines. The analysis evaluates 
the extent to which this convergence in transatlantic merger review conforms more 
closely to the preferences of regulators or merging firms. 
Domestic political oversight and legal obstacles in the EU and US act as 
barriers to convergence and prohibit the free exchange of confidential business 
information that regulators need for merger review. The MWG’s Best Practice 
Guidelines show that regulators have overcome these institutional obstacles by using 
their considerable discretionary authority to pursue transatlantic information 
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exchanges. In this context, the relationship between procedural and substantive 
convergence and information sharing is crucial to the understanding of transatlantic 
competition relations. By increasing procedural convergence over information 
exchanges, the regulators increase the likelihood of convergence in substantive 
decisions (i.e., to approve or prohibit a given merger), which reduces the likelihood of 
intervention by political principals. While acting under their discretionary authority, 
the competition regulators strive for substantive and procedural convergence within 
the legal institutional limits decided by their respective political principals. 
The regulators’ high level of discretionary authority also raises the prospect of 
capture by merging firms. As the providers of crucial business information, merging 
firms maintain a strong position to obstruct transatlantic convergence that is not in 
their interests. While merging firms prefer substantive convergence of regulatory 
approval in individual reviews, they are likely to support procedural convergence only 
when it speeds up the approval process and ensures the protection of confidential 
business information. Despite the strong position of firms, the analysis suggests that 
regulators have used their discretionary authority to pursue substantive and procedural 
convergence in a manner that avoids capture by merging firms. While procedural 
convergence speeds up the approval process and respects the protection of 
confidential information, it also reduces the information asymmetry that benefits the 
merging firms by incorporating third parties into the review process. In addition, as 
merging firms increasingly waive their rights to confidentiality, they increasingly 
serve the interests of the regulators who prefer avoiding the divergent substantive 
decisions that could prompt political intervention. 
In short, it is the EU and US competition regulators who have used their 
discretionary authority to overcome domestic institutional obstacles and to shape 
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convergence in a way that captures the firms that they regulate. Building on a formal 
framework for information exchanges, convergence is now an important trend in this 
policy area because it suits the interests of regulators and largely addresses the needs 
of firms without challenging the domestic statutory limits of EU and US competition 
law. 
The paper proceeds in the following manner. The next section introduces two 
competing explanations of convergence that emphasize the role of regulators 
(principal-agent) and firms (regulatory capture). The section also identifies the 
reasons why convergence would be expected to be in the interests of these two actors. 
The third section discusses the transatlantic framework for cooperation in merger 
review and the emergence of the EU-US Mergers Working Group. The section 
evaluates the extent to which the working group’s Best Practice Guidelines conform 
more closely to the interests of the regulators or merging firms. The final section 
summarizes the findings and suggests areas for future research. 
 
II. The Domestic Sources of Convergence 
As noted in the introduction, the internationalization of competition issues has 
led to important bilateral and multilateral efforts to prevent associated political 
disputes and anticompetitive business activities from destabilizing the international 
political economy. The creation of the International Competition Network is the 
latest, but not the only, multilateral effort to address these problems and to encourage 
convergence among national competition policies.
2
 Given their large market sizes and 
high economic diversity (Drezner 2007: 35-36), the EU and US are two of the most 
important players in these efforts. As such, their domestic experiences with bilateral 
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convergence should provide important insights that will help to inform and shape 
further multilateral convergence in competition policy. 
Despite the existence of transatlantic divergences in some individual merger 
cases, this study focuses on the convergence of EU and US competition policies. To 
be clear, this study does not assume that EU and US competition policies are 
completely convergent. Indeed, important differences do exist. The head of the EU’s 
Competition Directorate, Philip Lowe, notes a number of areas in which transatlantic 
differences and difficulties remain: coordination of investigations, different legal 
systems, different enforcement cultures, different priorities, language problems, 
shortcomings in the internal organization of competition authorities, and lack of 
transparency (2006: 4). That being said, this article adopts the view that highly 
publicized disagreements are ‘the exception rather than the rule’ (Evenett et al. 2000: 
19) and that the dominant trend in this policy since the 1990s has been one of 
convergence rather than divergence.
3
 By looking beyond the pre-occupation with rare 
divergent cases, the study is able to identify and assess more accurately the domestic 
and bilateral politics over time that lead to substantive and procedural convergence in 
transatlantic merger review. Such a broader investigation is more useful for evaluating 
the role of regulators and firms and for determining future EU-US and multilateral 
competition relations.  
How then can the causes and processes of that convergence be conceptualized 
and analyzed? Scholarly investigations of convergence often define the phenomenon 
as a ‘tendency of societies to grow more alike, to develop similarities in structures, 
processes, and performances’ (Kerr 1983: 3).4 Researchers in international political 
economy and other areas have employed a variety of theoretical approaches and 
methods to test for the causes and effects of convergence.
5
 Many studies test for the 
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existence of convergence, which requires an analytical sensitivity to ‘distinctions 
between goals, content, instruments, outcome and style’ (Bennett 1991: 230). Instead 
of testing for the existence of convergence, this study investigates the actors and 
institutions that drive the process of convergence in transatlantic competition 
relations.
6
 
Broadly speaking, three domestic actors play prominent roles in the process of 
transatlantic convergence in this policy area: politicians, regulators and firms. From a 
theoretical perspective, two competing explanations — principal-agent and regulatory 
capture — provide insights into the roles played by these actors and the ways in 
which they may act as sources of convergence. These two approaches also differ in 
the extent to which they see certain actors as the most important drivers of 
convergence. 
The principal-agent approach illuminates the relationship between politicians 
and regulators. The approach is particularly suitable for testing herein due to the 
domestic institutional constraints that exist in competition policy and the high level of 
discretionary authority delegated to EU and US competition regulators. The 
discretionary authority allows considerable latitude for the regulators to pursue their 
interests, share information and pursue convergence between their respective 
competition policies. Alternatively, regulatory capture illuminates the relationship 
between regulators and firms. This approach is worth testing in the current context 
because the regulators must rely on firms as crucial sources of information during 
transatlantic merger reviews. Such an information asymmetry can create opportunities 
for firms to capture regulators in ways that drive convergence to satisfy business 
interests. 
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A. Principal-Agent Explanation 
According to the principal-agent approach, political principals rationally 
delegate regulatory authority on a contractual basis to non-elected agents. After 
delegating this authority, the ability of principals to control their agents is challenged 
by inherent information asymmetries that favor the agents. In merger reviews, 
principals cannot legislate and observe every case that comes before the competition 
agents. Rather, principals grant regulatory agents a degree of authority to undertake 
merger reviews at their own discretion, which reduces the principals’ costs of 
implementing competition policy. While maintaining their independence from 
political principals, regulators use their discretionary authority to decide on matters 
not specifically codified in statute. However, when discretionary authority is broad, 
agents can use their technical and institutional expertise to pursue regulatory policy 
that conforms to their own preferences (Moe 1984). 
But agent discretion is not completely unchecked by principals. Principals 
develop control mechanisms to overcome the inherent problems that arise from 
information asymmetries and agent discretion. These control instruments are 
embedded in domestic legal arrangements that are frequently categorized as 
administrative and oversight procedures. Administrative procedures are typically 
established during the initial delegation of regulatory authority to the agents. These 
administrative procedures ‘define ex ante the scope of agency activity, the legal 
instruments available to the agent, and the procedures to be followed by it’ (Pollack 
1998: 220). After the initial delegation, principals have recourse to two types of 
oversight procedures: monitoring and sanctioning. Monitoring can take many forms, 
including public hearings, standing oversight committees, third-party constituent 
complaints and judicial review (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). Sanctioning 
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provides a broader array of control instruments, including ‘control over budgets, 
control over appointments, overriding of agency behavior through new legislation, 
and revision of the agency’s mandate’ (Pollack 1998: 220-21). The current study is 
interested in the extent to which the existence of these various control instruments 
influence agent behavior. 
In competition policy, EU and US political principals established over time the 
administrative and oversight control instruments generally identified in the literature. 
In the EU, domestic control instruments were developed in Regulation 17 (1962) and 
the Merger Control Regulation (1990, 1997, 2004). In the US, domestic control 
instruments were developed in the Sherman Act (1890), Clayton Act (1914), Federal 
Trade Commission Act (1914) and Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (1976). In addition, the EU 
and US principals maintain the ultimate authority to sanction their regulators by 
changing respective domestic competition laws.
7
 
This study simplifies the EU’s political principals as its Member States acting 
individually or collectively through the Council of Ministers or the European Council, 
while the US political principals are Congress and the White House. In the EU, the 
regulatory agent is the European Commission, or more precisely, the Competition 
Directorate. Two actors function as the primary agents in US competition policy: the 
US Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission. 
Differences between EU and US competition laws can lead to substantive 
divergences in the definition of relevant product and/or geographic markets, which 
can result in dramatically divergent market analysis calculations. Similarly, 
procedural differences are embedded in domestic competition policies, such as 
different timetables for competition investigations, different evidence-gathering tools 
and different roles for the judiciary. Procedural obstacles also exist that prohibit the 
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free exchange of important information between the regulatory authorities. As Gerber 
argues, cooperation in competition policy ‘is essentially about transferring 
information, and the transfer of many of the most important forms of information 
require authorization by the political authorities of the revealing state’ (1999: 135). 
Legal procedural obstacles thus reflect the concern of political principals that the 
‘receiving state might use information to the advantage of its own firms and to the 
disadvantage of the transferring states’ firms’ (Gerber 1999: 135). 
In accordance with EU procedures, competition authorities are prohibited from 
sharing confidential information obtained from merging firms without the express 
approval of those firms.
8
 The legal situation differs in the US where competition 
authorities may exchange confidential information with overseas regulators without 
the consent of the firms. However, according to the 1994 US International Antitrust 
Enforcement Assistance Act, such exchanges of confidential information should be 
based on reciprocity. Because the EU’s competition authorities are legally prohibited 
from communicating confidential information (without express consent), US 
competition authorities are unable to exchange freely such information obtained 
during competition investigations (Svetlicinii 2006: 5).
 
So, given the presence of political principals and different institutional 
constraints, how and why would EU and US competition regulators pursue 
convergence of their respective merger reviews? The application of domestic 
competition policies to increasingly international business activity has raised the 
prospect that different domestic competition policies will overlap and come into 
conflict. For example, competition regulators in different jurisdictions may reach 
divergent substantive decisions on how to treat a given multijurisdictional merger. 
These divergent substantive decisions may directly conflict when one regulator 
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approves a merger and the other prohibits the transaction, as occurred in the 
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas case. Divergent substantive decisions may also include 
disagreements over the precise remedies (e.g., divestment of assets, implementation of 
licensing agreements) that firms must offer in order to gain regulatory approval of a 
merger, as occurred in the GE/Honeywell case. 
In any merger review, competition regulators prefer avoiding outcomes that 
are not favorable for overall competition within their respective markets.
9
 When a 
merger is multijurisdictional, regulators also prefer avoiding divergent substantive 
decisions because they can prompt politicians intent on resolving the dispute to 
intervene with various control instruments. Regulators are interested in limiting this 
political intervention because, in the words of former EU Competition Commissioner 
Mario Monti, competition decisions are ‘a matter of law and economics, not politics’ 
(European Commission 2001).
10
 Such politicization increases the pressure on 
competition officials to conduct their analyses for reasons other than their legal and 
economic regulatory objectives. 
Dispute resolution via political intervention — including threats and the actual 
imposition on foreign firms of various punitive measures based in domestic law — 
also raises the prospect that competition decisions may be linked to trade disputes and 
other non-competition issues (Fox 1995). As a result, the final outcome of the 
investigation is uncertain and may not reflect the initial analysis and decision of the 
competition regulators. Divergent decisions can also trigger wider political conflicts 
that the competition agents prefer avoiding. The International Competition Policy 
Advisory Committee argues that, in such an environment, convergence should be 
pursued because ‘When divergence occurs, it is the agencies that must often explain 
and at times attempt to reconcile their differences. Clashes also may lead to trade 
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wars’ (ICPAC 2000: 41). The OECD adds that ‘Encouraging convergence in national 
competition policies towards best practice standards should lessen trade frictions. 
Convergence serves as a conflict avoidance tool’ (2000: 3). 
In order to avoid undesirable political intervention in individual merger cases 
and to reduce the likelihood that disagreements will lead to wider political disputes, 
regulatory agents prefer convergence of procedures for exchanging information, 
which increases the likelihood of convergent substantive decisions. In accordance 
with the PA approach, regulatory agents should be expected to seek this convergence 
in areas under their discretionary authority. Procedural convergence via non-
discretionary changes to domestic competition law protecting confidential information 
would prompt direct legislative intervention by the same political principals whose 
intervention the competition agents generally prefer avoiding. 
 
B. Regulatory Capture Explanation 
In addition to the regulatory agents, another potential driver of convergence 
arises from the theory of regulatory capture. According to Stigler, regulatory capture 
occurs when public regulation is ‘acquired by the industry and is designed and 
operated primarily for its benefit’ (1971: 3). By carefully allocating their financial and 
organizational resources, business interests can ‘capture’ and exert pressure over 
regulatory agents in order to achieve a favorable outcome for themselves. Such 
outcomes increase the ability of individual firms to maximize profits and/or markets 
but may not be favorable for overall competition within those markets.
11
 
While firms maintain a financial and organizational resource advantage, their 
influence over regulatory agents can be further enhanced by information asymmetries 
that benefit the firms. According to Gatsios and Seabright, regulatory capture occurs 
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‘usually because asymmetries of information between government and firms require 
the regulatory agency to be closely involved with firms on a day-to-day basis, with a 
resulting tendency to identify with the aims of the firms themselves’ (1989: 46). 
These information asymmetries are inherent in merger review because ‘firms are also 
the main source for specialist information, a fact which also gives considerable scope 
to bias or changes the character of official governmental consideration’ (Doern 1995: 
204). Such information asymmetries become readily apparent in the institutional 
structure of the merger review process where the regulators rely on merging firms to 
provide sensitive and confidential business information about their market activities. 
As the regulatory agents’ discretionary authority increases, the opportunity 
also increases for the targets of regulation (merging firms) to influence its shape 
(Doern 1995). Gatsios and Seabright agree, arguing that because merger policy is an 
exemplary case of discretionary regulatory authority, it is more susceptible to 
regulatory capture. They argue that competition regulators are vulnerable to capture 
by merging firms because under discretionary regulation ‘there is uncertainty not only 
about the facts relating to particular firms but also about the precise aims that the 
regulatory agency is pursuing’ (1989: 46). 
If merging firms are able to capture competition regulators, would they push 
for increases in transatlantic convergence? Merging firms are fundamentally 
interested in gaining regulatory approval of their proposed merger. When their merger 
is reviewed in both EU and US jurisdictions, the firms seek a convergent substantive 
regulatory decision that approves the transaction. They prefer the regulators reach this 
convergent substantive decision as quickly as possible while protecting confidential 
business information. The behaviour of merging firms, therefore, revolves around 
three interrelated issues: approval, speed and confidentiality. 
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First, merging firms require convergent regulatory approval of their 
transaction. Without convergent regulatory approval, a merger would be prohibited 
and the firms subjected to punitive measures in either one or both of the jurisdictions. 
In cases where the regulators have concerns over the domestic anticompetitive effects 
of the merger, approval requires some type of negotiated deal on possible remedies, 
such as the divestment of certain assets. Second, regarding the need for speed, 
mergers are sensitive to the passage of time because of possible changes to the 
economic and industrial structure factors that initially led to the proposal (Gilchrist 
2000/2001: 2).
12
 Speed is also important because, until the transaction is approved, a 
competitor that has recently become aware of a pending merger deal may submit a 
rival or hostile take-over bid for one of the merging parties (Cini and McGowan 2009: 
145). Third, merging firms are interested in protecting confidential information during 
the merger review process. Such confidential information may include a firm’s trade 
secrets, proprietary information, and information relating to business strategies, 
investment plans and marketing goals and methods (ICPAC 2000: 65). The leaking of 
this information may have negative consequences on share prices and be used to the 
benefit of competitors. 
Merging firms are, therefore, interested in substantive convergence of 
transatlantic regulatory approval and procedural convergence to the extent that it 
speeds up the review process and protects confidential information. The convergence 
of procedures and sharing of information is generally argued by scholars and 
regulators to increase the speed of transatlantic investigations and increase the 
likelihood of regulators reaching similar substantive decisions and consistent 
remedies.
13
 Despite these incentives, merging firms may have reason to resist 
procedural convergence, particularly as it pertains to sharing confidential information 
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and the coordination of timing for investigations (ICC 1999; Parisi 1999). First, the 
firms may be suspicious of the extent to which confidential business information is 
fully protected from competitors when it is shared between EU and US competition 
authorities reviewing their merger. Second, if a firm is engaging in anticompetitive 
behavior that adversely affects one of the jurisdictions, by restricting certain 
information exchanges between the respective regulators, it may be able to hide 
incriminating evidence. Third, firms may want to undertake strategic disclosures of 
information to the different competition regulators. By providing different amounts 
and types of information, they may try to play the competition authorities against each 
other and attempt to influence the regulatory decisions in their favor. Likewise, firms 
may wish to avoid procedural convergence in timing of investigations conducted by 
the EU and US competition regulators. According to Svetlicinii, ‘merging parties 
could first notify the authority which is more likely to approve the proposed 
concentration with the aim to use it as a tool for advocating the arguments for the 
approval to the other side’ (Svetlicinii 2006: 10).14 
The nature of merger review requires close, regular contacts between 
regulators and merging firms due to the information asymmetries that benefit the 
firms. Because competition regulators are required to collect large amounts of 
information under tight regulatory deadlines, they must depend heavily on merging 
firms for sensitive business information about current and prospective market shares 
and market activity. This information asymmetry and the resulting dependency may 
increase the possibility that competition regulators are captured by firms and pursue 
convergence in ways that satisfy the interests of those same firms that are being 
regulated. 
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In sum, while regulators and merging firms prefer substantive convergence of 
decisions in individual cases, their positions differ over procedural convergence. In 
accordance with the principal-agent approach, competition regulators prefer 
substantive and procedural convergence, and they prefer this convergence to occur 
under their discretionary authority. Such discretionary convergence reduces the 
likelihood of divergent decisions, which reduces the likelihood of political 
intervention in individual cases and reduces the need for non-discretionary legislative 
changes. In accordance with the regulatory capture approach, merging firms are also 
interested in increasing the likelihood of regulatory approval via the substantive 
convergence of EU and US decisions. Their support for procedural convergence, 
however, is conditioned by the demand that it speed up regulatory approval and 
protect confidential information. In any given case, merging firms may also see it in 
their interest to oppose the sharing of information and coordination of timings, which 
makes them generally more wary of procedural convergence than the regulators. 
As both the regulators and firms prefer convergence of substantive decisions, 
the real test of their relative influence as drivers of transatlantic convergence in 
merger review is over procedural convergence and the extent to which they support 
and operate within their domestic institutional settings. An empirical investigation of 
the EU-US Mergers Working Group and its Best Practice Guidelines should reveal 
whether procedural convergence in transatlantic merger review conforms more 
closely to the interests of regulators or firms. 
The following analysis relies on a variety of primary sources — including 
bilateral agreements, official speeches, public documents, official reports, expert 
interviews — and secondary sources. Among the primary sources used, it should be 
noted that the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee (ICPAC) was 
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established in November 1997 by the US Attorney General and Assistant Attorney 
General for Antitrust. Its final report reflects two year’s worth of hearings and 
contributions from the business, academic, economic and legal communities in the US 
and other jurisdictions, including the EU. The positions of individual interviewees are 
described in general to protect their anonymity, as agreed by the author. In an effort to 
place the empirical test in the correct context, many of the primary sources are drawn 
from the period during which the events in question occurred. 
 
III. The MWG — A Discretionary Effort at Convergence 
Before analyzing the origins and work of the EU-US Mergers Working Group, 
it is useful to concentrate on two formal competition agreements that set the stage for 
convergence in transatlantic merger review.
15
 First, the EU and US competition 
authorities signed a Bilateral Competition Agreement in 1991.
16
 The agreement’s 
central components include: 1) notification when competition enforcement activities 
may affect the ‘important interests’ of the other agency; 2) exchange of non-
confidential information; 3) coordination of investigations; 4) conduct of enforcement 
activities, ‘insofar as possible’, that are consistent with objectives of the other agency; 
and 5) consultation. Careful to stay within the discretionary authority of the 
competition regulators, the agreement is voluntary and does not override existing 
national competition laws. The bilateral agreement reduces the potential for divergent 
EU-US decisions by formalizing the exchange of non-confidential information at 
multiple stages of competition investigations. Case handlers for individual merger 
reviews ‘try to synchronize their fact-finding actions and coordinate their respective 
approaches on the definition of relevant markets, on points of foreign law relevant to 
the interpretation of the case, and on possible remedies to ensure they do not conflict’ 
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(Devuyst 2001: 324).
17
 Their discussions help to identify applicable legal principles 
and precedents as well as issues relevant to analyzing the competitive effects of 
proposed mergers. According to ICPAC, these cooperative measures have been 
instrumental in encouraging convergence in transatlantic competition relations: 
‘Perhaps the most notable steps toward convergence have occurred between the 
United States and the EU, presumably because of the high level of interaction and 
cooperation between the two jurisdictions following the implementation of [the 
Bilateral Agreement]’ (2000: 51). While the agreement itself does not explicitly 
mention substantive or procedural convergence, key negotiators hoped that the 
increased contacts among competition regulators would eventually lead to such an 
outcome.
18
 
Second, the EU and US competition authorities agreed the Administrative 
Arrangements on Attendance in 1999. Again, this agreement is not binding and does 
not override existing national competition laws.
19
 Rather, it clarifies a discretionary 
and reciprocal procedure for allowing representatives of foreign competition 
authorities to attend internal hearings and meetings in cases of mutual interest. In 
accordance with domestic law, attendance by foreign competition officials must be 
approved by the merging firms in cases where confidential information may be 
discussed.
20
 When conducting their respective competition investigations, EU and US 
regulators frequently meet with the targeted firms as a way to increase their 
information on the market impact of the activity in question. Before this agreement, 
requests for attendance were handled on a case-by-case basis.
21
 By simplifying the 
procedure for attendance into a standard discretionary practice, the agreement is 
intended to reduce information asymmetries and reduce the likelihood that 
competition regulators will reach divergent substantive decisions on the same merger 
 20 
case. While limited to merger review, Monti identifies such exchanges of 
representatives as ‘a virtually unprecedented step forward in EU-US regulatory 
cooperation’ (2001b). 
Reflecting the concerns of the regulators, both of the formal EU-US 
agreements were negotiated under their discretionary authority as a way to avoid the 
legal requirement of political intervention/approval. Reflecting the concerns of firms 
regarding the treatment of sensitive business information, both agreements explicitly 
respect domestic laws that protect the confidentiality of such information (Damro 
2006b). 
Following these agreements, high-level EU and US competition authorities 
decided to explore further, under their discretionary authority, areas of merger review 
ripe for transatlantic convergence (James 2002; Kolasky 2002a; Pitofsky 2000). In 
October 1999, the EU and US competition agents established the transatlantic 
Mergers Working Group (MWG) as an ad hoc forum to address common problems in 
merger review. Reflecting its discretionary nature, the MWG was not established by a 
legally binding agreement, but rather two provisions of the 1991 Bilateral Agreement: 
the general provisions in Article III for increasing information exchanges and Article 
VII on consultations. The competition agents decided early that they wanted the group 
to be informal, with an agenda reflecting their regulatory needs at any given time. The 
MWG’s membership and meeting schedule is flexible and, while it generates working 
papers and shared notes, all are considered internal documents.
22
 The group’s flexible 
nature is important because its members ‘are very busy people working daily on cases 
with limited time resources’.23 
While the MWG is informal and non-binding, it serves as a forum for 
developing ways to limit political intervention, at least indirectly, by exploring the 
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potential for convergence in discretionary areas of EU and US merger review (Damro 
2006b). By exploring areas ripe for convergence, the MWG seeks to reduce the 
likelihood of divergent substantive decisions, which, in turn, will reduce the 
likelihood of political intervention in individual merger cases. By remaining informal 
and under the discretionary authority of the competition agents, the MWG also avoids 
the intervention of political principals in its general activities. In short, as the EU’s 
former Director-General for Competition Alexander Schaub argued, the MWG 
facilitates the prevention of ‘high-profile transatlantic political disputes’ (2001: 11). 
Following numerous meetings and tele/video conferences, the EU’s 
Competition Directorate and the US Department of Justice and Federal Trade 
Commission endorsed the MWG’s efforts toward convergence (Monti 2002; 
Melamed 2000; Kolasky 2002a). Indeed, the MWG has been credited with concrete 
successes leading to convergence in the EU’s Notice on Remedies (European 
Commission 2002; Monti 2002) and the US decision to publish the motivation of their 
decisions not to challenge certain relevant actions (Monti 2004; USDoJ 2002). This 
evidence of convergence is notable in that it is not coercive or unidirectional, rather it 
follows from ‘a mutual learning process based on mutual experience’.24 In addition, 
both of these instances of convergence occurred in areas under the discretionary 
authority of the competition regulators, not a change to the non-discretionary statutes 
governing competition policy. 
In 2002, the MWG established three sub-groups, one to deal with procedural 
issues and two others to deal with substantive issues on the conglomerate aspects of 
mergers and the role of efficiencies in merger analysis. The work of these sub-groups 
included a series of video conferences ‘involving presentations and discussions of 
each other’s policy approach and of the lessons learned from the review of mergers. 
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The officials involved also made a visit to each other’s agencies’ (European 
Commission 2003: 4).
25
 
As the MWG’s agenda expanded, the sub-group on procedural issues worked 
to clarify a set of best practices in transatlantic merger review.
26
 Although the MWG 
was not explicitly designed to generate public documents, these discussions resulted 
in the guidelines on Best Practices on Cooperation in Merger Investigations.
27
 The set 
of best practices was publicly issued in October 2002 by EU Competition 
Commissioner Mario Monti, Chairman of the US Federal Trade Commission Timothy 
Muris and US Assistant Attorney-General for Antitrust Charles James ‘with a view to 
minimising the risk of divergent outcomes, and to enhancing the good relationship 
developed over the last decade’ (European Commission 2003: 5). According to 
Holger Dieckmann, an official in the EU’s Competition Directorate, the guidelines 
provide a good example of how ‘a policy dialogue on procedures’ can improve 
cooperation in individual merger cases: ‘In particular, they should ensure that both 
sides are always aware of the stage their respective investigations have reached, and 
how they are both thinking in terms of substantive competition analysis at any given 
point. This should serve to avoid misunderstandings or surprises’ (2003: 8-9). 
The guidelines identify central objectives and four specific areas (coordination 
on timing, collection and evaluation of evidence, communication between the 
reviewing agencies and remedies/settlements) in which procedural cooperation and 
convergence will reduce the likelihood of divergent decisions in individual merger 
cases. The remainder of this section assesses the Best Practice Guidelines (BPG) with 
the intent of identifying the ways in which practices conform to or conflict with the 
interests of regulators and firms. 
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Among its objectives, the BPG mentions that nothing in the document will 
override respective domestic laws and enforcement responsibilities of the competition 
agents. The BPG provides an advisory framework, identifies a number of best 
practices that are routinely employed informally and makes clear that the regulatory 
agents ‘reserve their full discretion in the implementation of these best practices and 
nothing in this document is intended to create any enforceable rights’ (p. 1). 
Regarding the motivation of the EU and US competition authorities, the BPG notes 
that the regulators ‘have an interest in reaching, insofar as possible, consistent, or at 
least non-conflicting, outcomes [because] Divergent approaches… undermine public 
confidence in the merger review process, risk imposing inconsistent requirements on 
the firms involved, and may frustrate the agencies’ respective remedial objectives’ (p. 
1). This claim speaks directly to the regulators’ desire for convergence in substantive 
merger decisions while highlighting the need to maintain public, and therefore 
political, confidence. 
Also among its objectives, the BPG argues for the active involvement of 
merging firms and third parties in the review process: ‘Given legal constraints 
existing in both jurisdictions, effective inter-agency coordination between the US and 
the EU depends to a considerable extent on the cooperation and good will of the 
merging parties, and to a lesser extent on third parties’ (p. 2). This cooperation and 
good will is encouraged particularly in the disclosure of sensitive business 
information, which is ‘subject to confidentiality restrictions’, and the timing of 
investigations (p. 2). By highlighting the confidentiality restrictions, the competition 
regulators reassure the firms (and political principals) that sensitive business 
information will not be used inappropriately or leaked to competitors. The role for 
third parties mentioned in the objectives is considered in more detail below. 
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Regarding the coordination of timing, the BPG urges merging parties to notify 
early their decision to merge and to discuss timing before filing in either jurisdiction. 
In transatlantic merger cases, firms must officially notify EU and US competition 
authorities of their intent to merge by submitting a Form CO and Hart-Scott-Rodino 
filing, respectively.
28
 The discussions of timings ‘will be most beneficial if held as 
soon as feasible after the transaction has been announced’ with the intent to 
‘synchronize’ the investigations to the extent possible under EU and US law (p. 3). 
The topics to be addressed in these discussions may include timeframes for filing and 
submitting information and the prospect of reaching a timing agreement (in the US) 
and/or a waiver from the obligation to notify within seven days of the conclusion of a 
binding agreement to merge (in the EU). According to the BPG, ‘The success of this 
effort depends on the active participation and cooperation of the parties, and would, in 
most cases, require the parties to discuss timing with the agencies before filing in 
either jurisdiction’ (p. 3). The guidelines, therefore, discourage merging firms from 
obstructing the timing of investigations for the purpose of playing one competition 
agency off the other. 
Regarding the collection and evaluation of evidence, the BPG notes that 
regulators may benefit from sharing publicly available information to assist with their 
respective investigations. This publicly available information allows regulators to 
cross-check the confidential information provided by firms. Specific to the actions of 
the merging firms, the BPG encourages the exchange of draft informational 
questionnaires, requests waivers of confidentiality, and encourages the firms to allow 
joint EU-US conferences and joint interviews with executives. In order to encourage 
merging firms to waive their legally-protected rights to confidentiality, the BPG notes 
the willingness of the regulators to provide sample waiver letters. The guidelines also 
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encourage waivers of confidentiality and joint interviews and conferences with third 
parties where appropriate (p. 3-4). If third parties are present during these meetings, 
the merging firms will typically request that they leave when confidential information 
is discussed.
29
 
Requests for waivers of confidentiality in merger cases were not always 
common practice in transatlantic competition policy. Throughout the 1990s, firms had 
to learn the modalities of this procedure and become confident that the competition 
regulators would not leak, whether intentionally or unintentionally, the sensitive 
information to their competitors (Janow 2000).
30
 Anecdotal evidence also suggests 
that competition authorities encourage merging firms to waive rights to confidentiality 
by arguing that such an action will increase the likelihood that foreign regulators will 
reach the same decision in a particular merger case.
31
 As a result of these incentives, 
waivers are increasingly granted nowadays, with merging parties usually agreeing 
blanket non-disclosure waivers (Svetlicinii 2006: 5). Because waivers of 
confidentiality are now common practice in merger cases, when merging firms decide 
not to waive their rights, competition regulators may actually perceive this behavior 
as evidence that the firms have something to hide (ICPAC 2000: 71).
32
 Such a 
situation can slow the merger review process as the regulators scrutinize the 
transaction through their own resources and without the benefit of input from 
regulators in the collaborating jurisdiction. 
The BPG also outlines the best practices for undertaking communication 
between the reviewing agencies. Each agency will typically designate a contact 
person who will be responsible for ‘setting up a schedule for conferences between the 
relevant investigative staffs of each agency; discussing with the merging parties the 
possibility of coordinating investigation timetables; and coordinating information 
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gathering or discovery efforts, including seeking waivers from the merging parties 
and from third-parties’ (p. 4). The BPG also sets out considerations for a typical 
timetable for consultations between the regulatory authorities, notes the possible need 
for involvement of high-level competition officials in the consultations, and highlights 
the ability of regulators to attend ‘certain key events in the other’s investigative 
process’ (p. 5), pursuant to the 1999 Administrative Arrangements on Attendance. All 
of these efforts at communication are undertaken under the discretionary authority of 
the regulators and are designed to increase their ability to exchange information. 
Finally, regarding remedies/settlements, the BPG recognizes that ‘the 
remedies offered by the merging parties may not always be identical, in particular 
because the effects of a transaction may be different in the US than in the EU’ (p. 5). 
Due to this possibility, the agencies ‘strive to ensure that the remedies they accept do 
not impose inconsistent obligations upon the merging parties’, to the extent consistent 
with their respective law enforcement responsibilities (p. 5). The BPG also advises 
merging firms to ‘consider coordinating the timing and substance of their remedy 
proposals’ (p. 5). The BPG concludes by noting that ‘Where appropriate, and 
consistent with confidentiality and/or non-disclosure obligations, the agencies should 
share draft remedy proposals or settlement papers, on which they may provide 
comments to one another, and participate in joint conferences with the parties, buyers, 
and trustees’ (p. 6). Again, mindful of their domestic institutional constraints, the 
regulators pursue discretionary ways to increase the likelihood of convergent 
remedies while respecting the firms’ rights to confidentiality. 
While the BPG focuses primarily on the roles of regulators and merging firms, 
the objectives and four sections are also noteworthy for specifically identifying a role 
for third parties in the merger review process. Such third parties may include 
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competitors, customers, suppliers, and members of the merging firms’ administration 
or management organs or recognized workers’ representatives.33 While outside the 
explanatory frameworks of principal-agent and regulatory capture, the role of third 
parties provides unexpected insights into the information asymmetry that is typically 
seen to favour the merging firms in the review process. In particular, the competitors 
of merging firms play an important role when participating in the market-testing of 
remedies proposed by the merging firms. 
During a merger review, third parties can submit their views in writing, or, if 
appropriate, participate in hearings and conferences with the competition authorities.
34
 
In oral hearings, third parties may be allowed to make formal presentations and ask 
questions of the merging firms. This access ‘provides an opportunity for competitors 
to encourage a single jurisdiction to hold a transaction hostage and thus use (or abuse) 
the process to delay and sometimes to disrupt mergers’ (ICPAC 2000: 63). In 
particular, the market-testing system offers considerable opportunity for third party 
influence over possible remedies. For competitive reasons, third parties are likely ‘to 
express dissatisfaction with whatever concessions are offered by the [merging] 
parties. The [merging] parties therefore are placed under great pressure to make that 
extra concession which it is hoped will lead to an acceptable compromise’ (Gilchrist 
2000/2001: 3). Gilchrist continues, ‘It would be illogical to expect competitors to say 
that concessions offered by parties to a merger are sufficient or perhaps even too 
much’ (2000/2001: 7).35 The input of these third parties may be amplified in cases 
where reliable, publicly available information is lacking and/or where complex new 
markets are being analyzed (Nourry 2000: 189).
36
 While this market-testing system 
may potentially disadvantage merging firms, it should be noted that competitors have 
strong disincentives from providing false information: they may be subjected to fines, 
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their submissions are cross-checked with other sources of information, and they prefer 
maintaining a positive reputation because a merger of their own may come up for 
review in the future.
37
 Likewise, this system is preferred over one that enlists 
independent consultants to undertake market-testing. Such an alternative system 
would increase the duration of the process, which would violate the merging firms’ 
preference for a speedy review and decision.
38
 
Without satisfying the concerns of third parties, the merging firms may reduce 
the likelihood of achieving their fundamental interest, obtaining regulatory approval 
of their proposed transaction. This influential role of third parties is the direct result of 
the competition regulators’ discretionary use of them to acquire information crucial to 
the convergent process of transatlantic merger review. Their contributions to the 
merger review process change the dynamic between regulators and merging firms. 
Thanks to third parties, the regulators do not have to depend as heavily as might be 
expected on the merging firms for sensitive business information about current and 
prospective market shares and market activity. Coupled with the increasing use of 
waivers of confidentiality, this reduction of the information asymmetry decreases the 
likelihood that competition regulators are captured by the interests of the merging 
firms. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
Despite the common tendency to focus on EU-US disagreements over high-
profile mergers, the preceding analysis suggests an increasing likelihood for the 
substantive convergence of transatlantic merger decisions. The findings also reveal a 
potential for procedural convergence under the discretionary authority of like-minded 
competition regulators. Convergence in this policy area builds on a formal framework 
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for information exchanges and has become a dominant trend because it suits the 
interests of regulators and largely addresses the needs of merging firms without 
challenging the domestic institutional constraints of EU and US competition law. 
The principal-agent and regulatory capture approaches offer useful analytical 
tools for highlighting the role of domestic institutions, deducing the interests of 
regulators and firms and assessing their relative influence in transatlantic merger 
review. An analysis of the Best Practice Guidelines of the EU-US Mergers Working 
Group reveals an important role for both regulators and firms as domestic sources of 
convergence in transatlantic competition policy. While political principals are not 
typically active in the daily implementation of transatlantic merger review, they are 
capable of intervening in cases of substantive divergence and their control instruments 
provide an ever-present reminder of their presence to the regulatory agents. 
The empirical analysis helps to assess the comparative explanatory power of 
principal-agent and regulatory capture approaches in this case. EU and US 
competition officials share a common interest in avoiding the political intervention 
and pressure that is provoked by divergent substantive merger decisions. In 
accordance with the principal-agent approach, this study finds that the regulatory 
agents pursue substantive and procedural convergence via their discretionary 
authority. Unique domestic institutions of EU and US competition law prohibit the 
free exchange of confidential information that is needed for fully-informed decision-
making in the merger review process. This obstacle has driven the competition 
regulators together to pursue convergence in merger review in a number of 
discretionary ways, as outlined in their Best Practice Guidelines: coordination of 
timing, collection and evaluation of evidence, communication between reviewing 
agencies, and remedies/settlements. By increasing procedural convergence, the 
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regulatory agents reduce the likelihood of reaching divergent substantive merger 
decisions that would prompt intervention by political principals. 
On the other hand, merging firms are also important sources of domestic 
convergence as they seek to capture regulators in ways that increase the likelihood of 
regulatory approval via substantive convergence of merger decisions. Their support, 
however, for procedural convergence depends largely on the extent to which it speeds 
up the approval process and protects confidential information. Regulators have 
overcome the legally-embedded information asymmetry that traditionally favored 
merging firms by encouraging them to waive rights of confidentiality and assuring 
that confidential information will be protected during synchronized investigations. 
The regulators have also reduced the information asymmetry that could contribute to 
regulatory capture by incorporating third parties into their coordinated merger 
reviews. As a result, it is the EU and US regulatory agents who have shaped the 
convergent process via their discretionary authority and captured the merging firms to 
serve their regulatory interests. 
The findings of this study suggest potentially fruitful avenues for further 
research on transatlantic and multilateral competition policy. While this article has 
focused on convergence in merger review, further research is necessary to determine 
the extent to which the findings are replicated in other areas of transatlantic 
competition policy. As domestic interests and institutions vary across other areas of 
competition policy, such as cartels, investigations of the conditions under which 
regulators exercise their discretionary authority and firms act as facilitators or 
obstructionists may provide a broader understanding of the process of convergence. 
Likewise, as the work of the EU-US Mergers Working Group has now been 
subsumed in the International Competition Network, further research is warranted on 
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the extent to which regulators are able to avoid political intervention and capture 
firms in similar multilateral processes of convergence in competition policy. As two 
of the most significant actors in the international political economy, the bilateral 
experiences of the EU and US should go a long way toward informing and shaping 
further multilateral convergence in this increasingly important policy area. 
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NOTES 
 
1 For varying perspectives on these cases, see Fox (2007); Anwar (2005); Morgan and McGuire (2004); 
Evans (2002); Damro (2001); James (2001); Kovacic (2001); Boeder (2000); McGowan and Cini 
(1999). 
2 Multilateral efforts have also been undertaken — with varying degrees of success — in the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development and World Trade Organization. For work on these efforts and the International 
Competition Network, see Damro (2007, 2006a); Djelic and Kleiner (2006); Roebling et al. (2003). 
3 For similar arguments from academics and competition officials, see Fox (2007); Barnett (2006); 
Monti (2004, 2001a); Pate (2004); James (2002, 2001); Schaub (2002); ICPAC (2000: 51, 56); 
Melamed (2000); Pitofsky (2000); Venit and Kolasky (2000); Gerber (1999); Parisi (1999). For 
examples of convergent decisions, see the following mergers: Halliburton/Dresser, Reuters/Telerate, 
Johnson & Johnson/Guidant, Exxon/Mobil, GE/Instrumentarium, Bayer/Aventis, GE/Agfa NDT, and 
MCI WorldCom/Sprint (Svetlicinii 2006). 
4 In the context of merger review, the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee equates 
‘convergence’ with ‘harmonization’ as ‘a process that relieves tensions between and among the laws 
and policies of different nations by bringing the laws and policies into a state of greater compatibility’ 
(ICPAC 2000: 42). 
5 For examples of different approaches, see Holzinger, Knill and Sommerer (2008); Ekins, Guzman and 
Simmons (2006); Swank (2006); Knill (2005); Holzinger and Knill (2005); Doremus et al. (1999); 
Berger and Dore (1996). 
6 For a study that includes investigations of transatlantic convergence in competition relations, see 
Evenett et al. (2000). 
7  For more extensive treatment of these control instruments, see Cini and McGowan (2009); Damro 
(2006b: 23-39); Gerber (1998); Sullivan (1991); Shughart (1990). 
8 Svetlicinii cites the relevant legal provisions as article 20 of Council Regulation 17/62 or equivalent 
provisions in other regulations in the field of competition as well as Regulation 1/2003 and the 2004 
EC Merger Regulation. Ham (1993: 588) provides a useful list of the domestic legal constraints in both 
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the EU and US that protect confidential information, including the EU’s Regulation 17, parts of the US 
Code and the Federal Trade Commission Act. See also Parisi (1999). 
9 Because the respective markets may differ significantly, competition officials looking at the same 
merger can (and sometimes should) come to divergent decisions simply because the transaction will 
have differing impacts on different markets (ICPAC 2000: 52). This reality is an important reason why 
full and consistent convergence of substantive decisions is unlikely ever to happen. However, ICPAC 
notes that ‘Government officials have observed that “even if the transaction needs to be addressed 
somewhat differently on both sides of the Atlantic because of differing market conditions and 
competitive realities, we reach solutions involving divestitures and licensing that neither conflict nor 
force firms to choose between complying with U.S. or EC law”’ (2000: 53). 
10 ICPAC agrees, arguing that competition ‘agencies must establish their independence and “parochial” 
political concerns should not play a role in the merger review process’ (2000: 63). This preference for 
remaining independent and avoiding political intervention is also supported by interviews with an EU 
Merger Task Force official (February 2001, Brussels, Belgium) and an EU External Relations 
Directorate official (May 2001, Brussels, Belgium). 
11 See Mattli and Woods (2009) for work on regulatory capture in the international context. 
12 ICPAC agrees, arguing that ‘Mergers are almost always time sensitive; delays may prove fatal to a 
transaction, particularly if it relates to a high technology industry, such as electronics, computers, or 
software, with a very short life cycle. In addition, delay breeds uncertainty in product, labor, and capital 
markets, enabling competitors to raid customers and staff’ (2000: 93). 
13 See Devuyst (2001); Monti (2001a); ICPAC (2000); Janow (2000); Pitofsky (2000); Parisi (1999); 
Van Miert (1998). 
14 This claim is supported by author’s interview with a US Department of Justice official, December 
1999, Washington, DC. See also ICPAC (2000: 72). 
15 For more on these two agreements, see Damro (2006b). While the 1998 Positive Comity Agreement 
also forms part of the transatlantic competition framework, it remains outside this study because it does 
not apply to merger review (Janow 2000: 33). 
16 Following a challenge before the European Court of Justice in 1994, the agreement was reconfirmed 
by a joint decision between the Council of Ministers and European Commission in 1995. 
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17 According to ICPAC, conflicting remedies are particularly problematic because they represent a 
situation in which a merging firm ‘is unable to comply with the remedies imposed by two different 
jurisdictions’ (2000: 52). This significant concern over conflicting remedies is also supported by an 
interview with the legal counsel for a major multinational corporation and member of the Competition 
Policy Subcommittee of the EU Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce, February 2001, 
Brussels, Belgium. 
18 Interview with former EU Competition Commissioner, April 2001, London, United Kingdom. 
19 The European Commission goes to great lengths to make clear that this accord is an ‘understanding’, 
not an official ‘agreement’ of legal equivalence to the 1991 Bilateral Agreement 
(http://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/bilateral/usa.html, last accessed 21 August 2009). 
20 Interview with US State Department official in US Mission to EU, May 2001, Brussels, Belgium. 
21 Interview with US State Department official in US Mission to EU, May 2001, Brussels, Belgium. 
22 Interview with EU Merger Task Force official, September 2001, Brussels, Belgium. 
23 Interview with US State Department official in US Mission to EU, May 2001, Brussels, Belgium. 
24 Interview with EU Competition Directorate official, May 2001, Brussels, Belgium. 
25 For more on the interactions of these sub-groups, see Kolasky (2002b: 6-7). 
26 The desire to clarify best practices was also heightened by the experience of the 2001 GE-Honeywell 
merger case (Kolasky 2002b). 
27 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/eu_us.pdf, last accessed 21 August 2009. 
28 These notification requirements, which also apply to mergers that are exclusively domestic in their 
effect, are based in the EU’s Merger Control Regulation (MCR) and the US’s Hart-Scott-Rodino Act 
(HSR). The MCR and HSR contain specific thresholds at which firms must officially notify 
competition authorities of their intent to merge. 
29 Interview with private practice competition lawyer, February 2001, Brussels, Belgium. 
30 This increase in firms’ confidence during the 1990s is supported by an interview with the legal 
counsel for a major multinational corporation and member of the Competition Policy Subcommittee of 
the EU Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce (February 2001, Brussels, Belgium), a 
private practice competition lawyer (February 2001, Brussels, Belgium), a member of the EU’s 
External Relations Directorate (January 2001, Brussels, Belgium), a Vice President of Public Affairs 
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for a major multinational corporation (July 1999, Brussels, Belgium), and a member of the EU’s 
Competition Directorate (July 1999, Brussels, Belgium). 
31 Interview with private practice lawyer and former member of European Commission’s Legal 
Service, February 2001, Brussels, Belgium. 
32 Interview with private practice competition lawyer, February 2001, Brussels, Belgium. 
33 The BPG did not create an entirely new role for third parties because such a change would have 
required political principals to amend non-discretionary legislation. Rather, the involvement of third 
parties is based on existing domestic statutes. For example, see EU Commission Regulation (EC) No 
447/98, 1 March 1998, on the notifications, time limits and hearings provided for in Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings. 
34 Such interactions are typically referred to as ‘oral hearings’ in the EU and ‘pitch meetings’ in the US 
DoJ. For more on oral hearings, see Durande and Williams (2005). 
35 For an assessment of the differing roles of competitors in EU and US merger review processes, see 
Venit and Kolasky (2000). 
36 Interview with two merger case handlers in EU’s Competition Directorate, January 2001, Brussels, 
Belgium. 
37 Interview with two merger case handlers in EU’s Competition Directorate (January 2001, Brussels, 
Belgium) and the legal counsel for a major multinational corporation and member of the Competition 
Policy Subcommittee of the EU Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce (February 2001, 
Brussels, Belgium). 
38 Interview with private practice lawyer and former member of European Commission’s Legal 
Service, February 2001, Brussels, Belgium. 
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